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The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the structure and the dynamics of interbank funding in Italy focusing on monthly data between January 2007 and December 2010. The focus of the analysis is on stocks (assets and liabilities) and not on market transactions. We use supervisory reports sent by Italian banks to the Bank of Italy.2 These data contain nominative information, which allow us to identify different reporting entities and counterparts. The analysis is developed using an ad hoc dataset which accounts for some discontinuities caused by a methodological break in supervisory reports. This allows to assess the impact of the crisis considering both trends that affected the entire market and trends that affected only specific market segments.
Since the outbreak of the financial turmoil the interbank market has been at the centre of the attention of both policy makers and researchers. The market is one of the main channels for monetary policy transmission and a major source of contagion among financial institutions. Liquidity on this market depends on the credit worthiness of its participants, especially for unsecured loans. During the crisis the combination of liquidity hoarding by lenders and the perception of a "stigma effect" for borrowers reduced the role of the market as a source of funding for banks.
The main facts shown in the analysis are the following. First, despite the positive trend of the pre-crisis period came to a halt, during the crisis there was no drastic fall of the overall lending and borrowing activity in the Italian interbank market. Second, while activity between banks belonging to the same group rose significantly, extra-group positions declined. Third, we observe a drop of bilateral positions, both domestic and foreign, secured and unsecured, which was partly compensated by an increase in positions vis-à-vis a central counterpart. Fourth, although foreign bilateral assets and liabilities declined, foreign intermediaries continued to provide funding through foreign branches and subsidiaries of 1 We are especially grateful to Giorgio Gobbi, Marcello Bofondi, Massimiliano Affinito, Vincenzo Cavazzino and Stefano Nobili. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Bank of Italy.
Italian banks and through central counterparts. Fifth, net foreign funding of large groups dropped during the most intense phase of the financial crisis and recovered thereafter. On the contrary, during the whole period small banks received liquidity from abroad and lent to other domestic banks; in particular, Italian subsidiaries of foreign banks continued to borrow from their parent companies. Finally, parent companies of major groups, which used to borrow from abroad and lend to other banks of the group, during the crisis reduced significantly their role as provider of intra-group liquidity and their net position became negative.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section presents the main characteristics of the Italian interbank market. The third section describes the dataset. The fourth analyses the impact of the crisis on interbank balance sheet positions, distinguishing between assets and liabilities. We focus on the riskier segments of the market in order to assess the effects of the turmoil where we expect them to be more evident. In particular, we concentrate on extra-group positions and further decompose the extra-group segment between domestic and foreign counterparties and between secured and unsecured loans. We also analyse the evolution of positions by maturity. Section 5 characterizes the direction of funds between different types of intermediaries. We analyse the relationships between large, medium and small groups, also distinguishing between foreign and central counterparts. The sixth section focuses on the 5 largest Italian groups and analyses separately positions held by the group leader and those accounted for by the other banks of the group. Section 7 concludes the paper and sums up the main evidences obtained with the analysis.
The Italian interbank market
Instruments and markets
The interbank monetary market allows banks to exchange short-term funds between each other through different financial instruments. The money market instruments used by Italian banks are deposits, repurchase agreements (repos) and certificates of deposits. At the end of 2010 deposits represented more than 80% of total interbank positions, of which 1/3 had overnight maturity. Repos accounted for slightly less than 20% of the total, certificate of deposits were a negligible fraction of the total. A broader definition of the relationships on the interbank market includes also derivative contracts, but we are not able to include them in our analysis since they are off balance sheet instruments.
3
Instruments can be either traded on regulated markets or over-the-counter (OTC). In
Italy an important electronic broker for unsecured deposits is the e-MID, which is supervised by the Bank of Italy. While OTC transactions and operations with a central counterpart ensure anonymity with respect to other market participants, transactions on the e-MID are transparent, meaning that the identity of counterparts is known. During the crisis the perception of a high "stigma effect" led borrowers to prefer anonymous markets over transparent ones; as a consequence the role of the e-MID in the interbank market decreased significantly. Since the beginning of the crisis the share of very short term transactions (overnight, tomorrow-next and spot-next) on the e-MID over the sum of e-MID and OTC transactions dropped from 2/3 to 1/3. Our dataset allows us to have a comprehensive picture of the whole interbank market.
We observe banks' balance sheet positions in deposits, repos and certificates of deposits, resulting from transactions executed on both regulated markets (such as e-MID, MTS, and MIC) and OTC markets. Data include both secured and unsecured instruments and transactions conducted either with a central counterpart or vis-à-vis other banks. Table 1 shows the structure of the interbank market before and after the crisis reporting both assets and liabilities. The overall interbank activity is divided between intra-group and extra-group operations; the latter are then broken down between positions vis-à-vis domestic, foreign and central counterparts, as well as between secured and unsecured transactions. This partition of the market is used in the following sections to analyse the impact of the crisis on interbank relationships.
The structure of the market
The table shows that in the interbank market most transactions take place between banks belonging to the same group. Moreover, the role of the intra-group segment increased during the crisis, probably because it is less sensitive to counterparty risk. In particular, the share of intra-group assets over total interbank exposures grew from 65% in January 2007 to 70% in October 2010. Source: Bank of Italy -Supervisory reports.
(1) Balance sheet positions include only money market instruments (deposits, repurchase agreements and certificates of deposits). (2) We report data as of October 2010 because of a discontinuity in the data in November 2010, caused by a merging operation within a major group.
The weight of central counterparts (CC&G and the Bank of Italy) in the interbank market used to be negligeable before the crisis. However, it increased rapidly thereafter during the last two years, going from 5% to 20% of total extra-group assets. In the same period, the share of secured assets decreased (from 50% to almost 40%) while that of secured liabilities rose (from 25% to almost 50%).
The activity on the interbank market is quite concentrated. The role played by the main banks mirrors their weight in the Italian banking system. The top 5 groups (Unicredit, IntesaSan Paolo, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and Unione di Banche Italiane)
represents around 65% of total positions, more than 90% of intra-group transactions, and about 50% of transactions with foreign counterparts. Their role consolidated during the crisis.
Data source
We use data from banks' supervisory reports. Reports are compiled monthly by all
Italian banks and contain a snapshot of banks' balance-sheet composition at the end of the reporting month. We extract data for assets and liabilities towards other banks or central counterparts that are recorded separately from assets and liabilities towards customers, central banks and other entities. We include only money market instruments, specifically deposits, repurchase agreements and certificates of deposits, regardless of the market where the transaction has taken place.
We consider positions of all Italian banks, with the exception of Italian branches of foreign banks. of these three components of foreign net funding will be analyzed separately in the following sections.
9 Differences between assets and liabilities may be also due to minor discrepancies in reported cross positions. In order to better assess the effects of the financial turmoil on interbank funding we now turn to disaggregated data. Specifically, we analyse the impact of the crisis on those segments of the interbank market which are more exposed to counterparty risk. We start with extra-group positions and then we further decompose this segment between positions vis-à-vis foreign and domestic counterparties, secured and unsecured loans, overnight and longerterm instruments.
Intra-group versus extra-group positions
We expect that the financial turmoil had a stronger impact on the extra-group segment of the interbank market, that is on transactions between banks not belonging to the same group. The extra-group segment is generally more exposed to counterparty risk than the intra-group one, as it is more sensitive to problems of asymmetric information. However, one should consider that extra-group exposures include also positions with central counterparts, specifically the CC&G and the Bank of Italy (on the MIC), for which there is practically no counterpart risk. 
Domestic, foreign and central counterparts
This section analyses the relation between the Italian banking system and foreign counterparts and checks how it has evolved since the outbreak of the financial turmoil. We expect the impact of the crisis to be more evident when transactions with foreign counterparties are analysed as they imply higher counterparty risk.
We focus exclusively on the extra-group segment, which, as we have just seen, is the area of the market that has suffered the crisis the most. Relationships of Italian banks with their foreign branches and subsidiaries are therefore excluded. We will come back to them in section 5, when we will analyse intra-group funding in a greater detail.
Figure 4
Share of foreign over total extra-group positions (per cent) 
Secured versus unsecured positions
A priori, it is not clear how the crisis should have impacted on secured funding.
Secured instruments have costs and benefits. From the lender's perspective, they are less exposed to counterparty risk than unsecured ones, as they involve the pledge of a collateral; from the borrower's perspective, they bear lower interest rates but, at the same time, require the immobilization of assets. Therefore, on the one side increasing counterparty risk might have boosted the use of collateralized transactions, on the other side higher cost of collateral might have favoured the recourse to unsecured instruments.
The increase in intra-group transactions we documented in section 4.1 can be seen as an attempt to reduce the recourse to costly secured borrowing. The share of secured operations over total intra-group ones is in fact quite low (about 20%) compared to that in the extra-group segment. To better assess the effects of the crisis on collateralized transactions, in this section we restrict our attention to extra-group lending and borrowing. On the liability side, Italian banks reduced unsecured borrowing, but continued to obtain funding through collateralized transactions. In particular, unsecured liabilities reduced from about 250 to 150 billions, while secured ones remained stable, at around 40. On the asset side, instead, the contraction was far more pronounced for secured (from 100 to 25 billions euro) rather than unsecured operations (from 125 to 100 billions). The decline in the most acute phase of the crisis in both secured and unsecured bilateral operations is mostly explained by transactions with foreign counterparts. In the most acute phase of the turmoil, as the price of counterparty risk rose, Italian banks reduced foreign transactions more than domestic ones, because the former were perceived as riskier.
As Italian banks used to borrow unsecured and lend secured vis-à-vis foreign counterparts, the contraction affected mostly unsecured liabilities and secured assets. We see that although secured assets declined for both domestic and foreign counterparts, the drop was much more pronounced for the latter.
Interbank positions by maturity
In this section the maturity breakdown of extra-group positions is analyzed. We focus on deposits, which is the only instrument for which we have a detailed and consistent maturity information since December 2008.
Figure 9
The share of overnight or sight deposits over total deposits (per cent) Deposits are the most common instrument for interbank borrowing and lending. They accounted on average for 70% of extra-group positions during our sample period and for more than 90% of intra-group volumes. About 30% of the deposits have very short maturities (overnight or sight deposits).
We expect funding with longer maturities to react more sharply to the crisis, given the higher liquidity risk implied by long term transactions. Figure 9 shows that the share of deposits with very short maturities over total interbank deposits increased during the crisis.
In particular, from December 2008 the share of overnight and sight deposits rose from about 25% to a peak of 40% in May 2010 for assets, while moved around 25-30% for liabilities.
Net funding relations by group size and domicile of the counterparts
In this section we analyse the direction of funding in the interbank market. The objective is to describe how liquidity moves across different types of banks and to check whether the structure of such relationships has suffered significant alterations. We restrict our attention to lending and borrowing transactions that take place between banks that do not belong to the same group, which is the market segment that experienced a significant contraction during the most critical phases of the crisis (see section 3.1). Intra-group net positions are instead analyzed in section 6.
As a first step banks are grouped in to 3 categories according to their size: "large banks" (UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and Unione di Banche Italiane), "medium size banks", and "small banks". We also divide counterparties between domestic, foreign, and central counterparts and distinguish domestic counterparts according to the three size classes specified above. 14 Banks that do not belong to any conglomerate are considered bank groups composed by one entity only. The classification into size classes is built upon that adopted by the Bank of Italy. Large banks belong to major
Funding relations within major bank groups
So far intra-group funding was excluded from the analysis. Here intra-group relations are studied to describe liquidity flows across banks of the same group. Attention is restricted on the 5 largest Italian groups (UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and Unione di Banche Italiane).
These groups give a comprehensive insight of intra-groups dynamics, given their dimensions and their relevance for the interbank market. During the period under analysis the largest five groups together held on average almost 65% of all interbank positions. The two most active groups accounted for about a half of total positions, while the remaining three groups account for about 15%. Their overall share in the extra-group segment oscillated around 30%; that in the intra-group was around 90%. These banks also played a central role in transactions with foreign counterparties. In October 2010 about 40% of extragroup assets and liabilities vis-à-vis foreign intermediaries was concentrated in the hands of the top five groups. Figure 10 shows the average share of assets and liabilities held by group leaders (the group's parent companies) in the intra-group and extra-group segments. Interbank positions appear quite concentrated in the balance sheets of group leaders. In the intra-group segment the average share of liabilities held by group leaders increased during the first months of the crisis, from 40% to over 55%, and remained stable thereafter; the share of assets instead declined from around 65% to 55%. In the extra-group segment the share of both assets and liabilities experienced a drastic increase (from 40% to 65%).
Italian groups. Medium size banks include groups and independent banks with total assets ranging between €21,532 and €182,052 millions, small banks banks those with total assets les than €21,531 millions. other domestic banks belonging to the same group, foreign branches or subsidiaries of the group, other domestic banks not belonging to the group, and foreign banks. The picture allows to analyse the dynamics of intra-group funding relationships. We find the following patterns. Group leaders borrowed mainly from foreign branches and subsidiaries of the group and to a lesser extent from other foreign banks. At the same time they almost exclusively lent to other banks of the group, while net positions vis-à-vis other domestic groups were modest.
During the crisis the role of the group leader changed significantly, as it ceased to be the reference entity for the funding of the group. In particular, starting from the second half of 2008 we observe a sharp decline of the leader's net lending to other banks of the group.
This change was only partially offset by a decline in net borrowing from foreign banks and produced a worsening of the leader's net position; this turned deeply negative in the second part of 2008 and remained at low levels thereafter.
Conclusions
The paper uses banks' balance sheet assets and liabilities in order to analyse how the crisis impacted on interbank funding relationships. To this purpose we use an ad hoc database which solves some methodological discontinuities in supervisory reports.
The analysis shows that the crisis had a clear negative impact on interbank funding, though there was no drastic fall in the overall interbank activity. In particular, we observe that interbank balance sheet positions shifted towards safer segments, like the intra-group segment, relations with central counterparts, and short-term instruments.
During the crisis there was a massive increase in volumes exchanged within groups.
This increase (about 230 billions from the beginning of 2007 to October 2010) was caused principally by the two largest Italian groups that are responsible for more than the 65% of the overall intra-group volumes. At the same time, the financial turmoil hit strongly the extragroup segment of the market which is characterized by higher counterparty risk. Finally, the analysis of intra-group relationships highlights the role of the group's parent company. Group leaders mainly borrowed from their foreign branches and subsidiaries and lent to other banks of the group. We show, however, that during the crisis group leaders reduced significantly their role as provider of intra-group liquidity.
The analysis conducted so far shows the potential of data from supervisory reports in studying the developments of the interbank funding. Nominative data are extremely valuable as they make possible to track all interbank connections between Italian credit institutions.
At the same time, data exhibit some limitation. First, there is a methodological discontinuity which need to be addressed. Second, information about financial instruments and maturities are often not sufficiently detailed. Instruments are grouped into macro areas that make difficult, for instance, to discern between liquidity management instruments and credit lines.
